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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Two conflicting state policies were pitted against each other in this case.
Following the lead of the federal government, New York enacted legislation in
1935 (Civil Practice Act §876-a) taking away from the courts the power of
injUorti n where labor disputes were involved except where very limiting pre-
requisites were met. Previously. the state had adopted a statute' 7 providing for
the enforcement of executory arbitration agreements and of arbitrators' decisions
themselves.' s This statute was amended five years after passage of the anti-
injunction legislation so as to specifica'ly validate arbitration agreements in labor
situations. 19
The Court had on previous occasions sustained the enforcement of mandatory
injunctions issued by arbitrators,2 0 but this is the first case to have involved
restraining injunctions against a labor union. The defendant unions argued
that the enforcement of an arbitrator's injunction by the lower court was equiva-
lent to the issuance of an injunction by the court and invalid under §876-a. But
the Court considered that the purpose of that section was to free unions from
judicially imposed injunctions and did not reach to an arbitration relationship
voluntarily entered into by the union, particularly in view of the statutory arbitra-
tion provisions. As long as the arbitrator's award is within his authority as
defined in the contract, his determination could be enforced even though a
different result would obtain had the controversy been initially submitted to the
courts.
2 1
Union Member's Remedies for Wrongful Expulsion
In a landmark decision, the Court this term determined that one wrongfully
expelled from a union may sue the union for damages from, its general funds
even though he cannot sustain an action against all of the members. 22 The general
rule, obtaining under the common law, was that voluntary associations, being
17. N. Y. ARBITRATION LAW OF 1920 (now N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT, Art. 84).
18. The common law rule in New York discouraged arbitration agreements
by refusing to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate differences. It was to
permit such specific enforcement and thereby to encourage reliance upon execu-
tory arbitration agreements that impelled 'adoption of the arbitration statute.
See Red Cross Line -v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924), which deals with
the New York statute.
19. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1448.
20. In re Devery, 292 N.Y. 596, 55 N.E.2d 370 (1944); In re United Culinary
Bar Grill Employees, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E.2d 104 (1949).
21. The problem of pre-emption was not adverted to in the decision, although
the employees were presumably engaged in interstate commerce. In Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme Court decided that
under §301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, federal common law applied in breach of
contract cases brought before federal courts. Although not yet decided, it would
seem that this would mean that pre-emption would apply and remove cases such
as I- re Ruppert from state jurisdiction. In connection with pre-emption, see
next preceding case note.
22. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
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neither legal entities nor partnerships, could only be sued by suing all of the
members.23 This proved virtually impossible in many cases, where, for example,
a union with many members was involved. The difficulty of service was lessened
by §13 of the General Associations Law which permits service and suit of an
officer of the association as a representative of the members. However, this
statute has been treated as one of procedural convenience only and not as changing
the substantive law.24 Thus, it was still necessary for recovery that all of the
members be liable, and their liability had to have arisen out of participation in and
approval or else ratification of the act complained of. 25 However, the Court, torn
by conflicting considerations of policy,26 did not adhere to any consistent policy
and in several cases allowed damages even though liability of all the members of
the union concerned was not shown.
2 7
The case Madden v. Atkins28 for the first time attempts to resolve the
previous inconsistency. Several members of a local union were expelled in accord-
ance with the procedure of the union's constitution but without approval of every
member. The expellees had opposed current union management at the polls,
and after defeat there, had formed a "party" within the union to carry on further
intra-union political activity. This, labeled as "dual unionism" was the basis of
the expulsion.
29
The constitution of an association creates a contract between the members,
and it has long been accepted that the privilege of expelling members in accord-
ance with the contract is inherent in the association. 0 The courts will not inject
themselves into such a controversy unless it is dearly apparent that the expulsion
or disciplinary action was capricious and without foundation, and then only after
the claimant has exercised all reasonable efforts to exhaust his appellate remedies
within the organization. 8 ' In the instant case, however, the Court found the
expulsion to have been completely arbitrary and unreasonable and, hence,
wrongful.
With respect to the damages demanded, the Court held that they would be
available to a plaintiff in an expulsion case, even though they could not assert
23. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 280, 101 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1951).
24. McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 92, 30 N.E. 728, 728-729 (1892);
Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 281, 101 N.E.2d 683,685 (1951).
25. Glauber v. Patoff, 294 N.Y. 583, 63 N.E.2d 181 (1945); Browne v. Hibbets,
290 N.Y. 459, 467, 49 N.E.2d 713, 717 (1943); Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N.Y. 225,
109 N.E. 244 (1915).
26. See Summers, Judicial Settlement of Internal Union Disputes, 7 BuFFAW
L. REV. 405 (1958).
27. Blek v. Wilson, 262 N.Y. 253, 186 N.E. 692 (1933); Polin v. Kaplan, 257
N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931).
28. 4 N.Y. 2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958).
29. Ibid.
30. Wilcox v. Royal Arcunan, 210 N.Y. 370, 104 N.E. 624 (1914).
31. Browne v. Hibbets, 290 N.Y. 459, 49 N.E.2d 713 (1943).
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liability upon each and every member of the union, provided that the expulsion
had been "brought about by action on the part of the membership, at a meeting
or otherwise, in accordance with the union constitution .... -32 The Court cites
appre-'irgly a case awarding damages where the claimant was unjustly expelled
by the executive board of the union, and it thus appears that "action on the part
of the membership" in the standard given is to be applied according to the dele-
gation of authority made in the union constitution and not restricted to specific
actions of the union, considered at merrership meetings.
33
The Court is here applying a shifting standard whereby enough liability is
imputed to the members to render the funds of the unions subject to judgment
under §13 of the General Association Law, but not enough liability is imputed
to render the members themselves liable in an action directly against them. In so
doing, the Court reaches a desirable result in accord with current realities.
Although a labor union, unlike a corporation, is not a legal entity, its ability to
inflict injury as a unit is no less effective.3 4 Mere restoration to membership
without award of damages would be small compensation where, as in this case,
claimants have incurred severe economic sanctions resulting from the union's
tortious acts.
The extent of the influence which the instant case will have is not clear. The
Court had held in a recent case involving a libel suit against a union for an
alleged libel which had been published in the union official paper that the action
could not be sustained unless the plaintiff proved the individual liability of each
member.3 5 Judge Fuld, at one point in the Madden decision, suggests that the
difference in the result there is a difference in the tort committed, damages being
permissible for wrongful expulsion but not for libel.3" Later, however, he says that
the libel case was dismissed simply because the complaint in that action failed to
allege authorization by the membership and left open the question as to what
1nature of ... proof" would be necessary to find such authorization in fact.31
Thus, it may be that the Court will apply the more liberal rule in cases coming
before it in the future. Manifestly, the difference ought not to be merely that
one is a Tort A case and another a Tort B problem. Recovery ought to hinge on
the reality of damage, not the nature of the tort. On the other hand, it may be
that the Court is merely saying that it will apply a less rigid standard to find
32. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 296, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 642 (1958).
33. Ibid.
34. Proceedings in the House of Commons, 1904, quoted in Unions as Juri-
dical Persons, 66 YALE L. J. 712 (1957):
Sir R. Reid interrupting: The trade unions are not corporations.
Prime Minister Balfour: I know; I am talking English,
not law.
See also United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
35. Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 280, 101 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1951).
36. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 294-295, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1958).
37. Id. at 296, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
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authorization in cases involving internal union disputes than in cases where a
union is sued by an outside party. This distinction would seem to rest on sheer and
transparent policy, however, and, it is to be hoped, will not be relied upon.
The Court's decision is a welcome stride forward from the position that
union is not liable except as all of its members are. Even if provisions in the
General Associations Law are purely procedural, there is no reason why the
substantive law of associations cannot develop in pace with changing societal
conditions, rather than continue to sustain a rule of law " . . . for no better
reason ... than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. '38
Application of Statute to Employer and Domestic
Section 240 of the Labor Law imposes a duty upon employers of persons
employed to, inter alia, clean buildings and structures, to furnish safe equipment
for such work, including scaffolding, ladders, etc. A domestic who, while cleaning
windows on a private dwelling, fell from a ladder and injured herself, attempted to
hold the householder liable for the injuries because of an alleged violation of this
section. The Court rejected the claim, however, holding that section 240 was not
intended by the legislature to apply to such a situation but only to circumstances
where cleaning is incidental to "building construction, demolition and repair
work." The section is an integral part of the article of the Labor Law dealing
with that subject and obviously was not meant to reach the controversy at issue.39
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Zoning-Constitutionality of Ordinance Discontinuing Non-Conforming Uses
The petitioner in Harbison v. City of Buffalo' operated a drum recondition-
ing plant on his own property in the city of Buffalo. He erected the building
thereon shortly after purchasing the property in 1924. At that time there were
located nearby a glue factory and a city owned dump. The area was unzoned at
the time, but in 1926 it was zoned for residential use and has remained so zoned,
with the exception of one short period, to the present time. From 1936 to 1956,
Harbison applied for and received licenses to conduct business as a junk dealer,
a classification which embraced drum reconditioners. In 1956, the petitioner
was refused a junk dealer's license and a drum reconditioning license pursuant
to a city ordinance passed in 1953, which provided for a cessation of certain
nonconforming uses, including "any junk-yard", within two years of the date of
38. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAIv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
39. Connors v. Boorstein, 4 N.Y.2d 172, 173 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1958).
1. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
